Failure is Not an Option, by Gene Kranz
©2000 Dick Stafford
In Failure is not an Option, Gene Kranz provides a first-hand account of manned space flight from NASA’s beginnings in 1960 through the last moon mission, Apollo 17, in December 1972. Gene left a career as a test pilot and joined NASA as an assistant flight controller for Project Mercury, working his way up to lead controller during Apollo 11. He is best known for his crucial role in the successful recovery of the ill-fated crew of Apollo 13. (For those of you who saw the movie Apollo 13, Ed Harris played Gene’s character.) For his leadership during Apollo 13, he was the co-recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom.
I submitted a review because I think a goodly number of rocketeers are also space buffs. This book probably appealed to me more than the average, however, since I spent five years working in and around JSC’s Mission Control Center just after college. Anyway, I heartily recommend it to everyone who is even remotely interested in our space program.
The material in this book was compiled from personal notes, NASA records, and interviews with many of the other participants. What struck me most was the intensity and dedication required to run a manned mission. The number of potentially disastrous problems, and the ingenuity and teamwork required to solve them was astounding. The first of these accounts was on Mercury Redstone 1, where a shutdown of the main engine triggered the ejection of the escape tower. The result was a fueled, live rocket on the pad, with the control umbilical separated and a partially filled chute attached. Sound familiar, anyone?
After reading this Gene’s account, I will be less critical of the problems NASA experiences. I, and the public, tend to forget that their work is experimental by nature and risk is a necessary part of progress in space. (OK, no comments from those who believe people don’t belong in space) As I was reading the book, I often thought about parallels with our sport. It struck me that the failures we encounter (CATOs, poor ejection, tangled chutes) are probably somewhat proportionate (given the relative complexities) to the problems described throughout the book. I wonder how many of ours would be avoided if we had more eyes looking over our designs, checklists, and preparations? Gene reminded me of a mega-LCO/RSO rolled into one no-nonsense package. Although our sport obviously doesn’t deserve the same scrutiny as NASA, I also wonder that, if Gene were the RSO at an HPR launch, how many less he would he let by?
This book is a 5!